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This paper uses the theories of price discrimination and optimal taxation to investigate effects of underwater
mortgages on foreclosures and the incentives to earn income, and the degree to which those effects
are shaped by public policy.  I find that the federal government’s means-tested mortgage modification
plan creates a massive implicit tax that may be significant even from a macroeconomic perspective.
 An alternative of modifying mortgages to maximize lender collections would also feature means tests,
but with less effort distortion and perhaps fewer foreclosures.  The paper also considers the consequences
of a public policy that left mortgage modification to lenders, subject to a requirement that modification
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By some measures, U.S. average housing prices have fallen by a third since 2006 
and some forecast them to fall further.  Prices have fallen more than fifty percent in Las 
Vegas and Phoenix, and nearly as much in Detroit, Miami and much of California.
2  As a 
result, almost 14 million home mortgages nationwide were “underwater” in early 2009: 
the amount owed exceeded the market value of the collateral.
3  About one third of home 
mortgages in Arizona, California, Florida, and Michigan, and more than one half of home 
mortgages in Nevada, were underwater. 
At the same time, U.S. employment has plummeted, especially in states that had 
large housing price increases prior to 2006.
4  Many factors – too many to be considered 
in a single paper – caused the 2008-9 recession, but the housing price cycle and its legacy 
of underwater mortgages is likely among them.   This paper investigates some effects of 
underwater mortgages on foreclosures and the incentives to earn income, and the degree 
to which those effects are shaped by public policy. 
 
                                                 
2 National and city-level housing price changes in this paragraph are for the Case-Shiller composite home 
price index. 
3 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/opinion/04mon2.html, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2832609020090528.  About one in four homes with 
mortgages were under water by 2009 Q2 (Levy, 2009). 
4 For example, employment from January 2006 to June 2009 fell by 6.9 (6.1) percent in Florida (Arizona) 
where housing prices had previously risen 96 (74) percent 2000-2005, as compared to the U.S. aggregate 
employment decline of 2.4 percent and prior housing price boom of 46 percent.  State-level employment 
data is total nonfarm payrolls from www.bls.gov.  Housing price changes cited in this footnote are 
calculated from the OFHEO index, which is available state-by-state, but tend to be less than changes in the 
Case-Shiller index.   2
Foreclosures as a Consequence of Negative Equity 
A homeowner always has the option to stop paying his mortgage.  Although state 
laws are somewhat different, to a good approximation the worst case scenario for a 
homeowner who stops paying is that he can no longer own or occupy the house, and may 
suffer a reduction in his credit rating that might raise his costs of future borrowing.  But if 
the combined value of the house and these costs were less than the present value of his 
promised mortgage payments, then he could do better than paying in full.  That’s 
probably an important reason why, as of early 2009, more than five million homes were 
already either in foreclosure (lenders were seizing the collateral as a consequence of lack 
of payment) or their owners were delinquent on their mortgage payments.
5 
When foreclosures are motivated by low home values rather than the quality of 
the match between a homeowner and his home, a foreclosure is inefficient because it 
requires the homeowner to live elsewhere.  The anticipation of foreclosure of an 
underwater mortgage probably also creates moral hazard in maintaining the house, 
because the occupant prior to foreclosure has no stake in the home’s value.  These are 
some of the reasons why public policy seeks to reduce foreclosures. 
In principle, lenders could create many of the proper incentives even without 
government intervention, by having homeowners be a claimant on the home’s value at 
the margin.  One conceptually simple way to achieve this is to write down the value of 
the mortgage so that it is less than or equal to the home’s market value and the mortgage 
is no longer underwater.  Once the mortgage was written down, the homeowner would 
have an incentive to continue paying the (written down) mortgage, or at least sell his 
home for maximum value in the marketplace to fully repay his (written down) mortgage. 
                                                 
5 Note that “inability to pay” is probably not enough by itself to create a foreclosure (Foote et al, 2009, 
footnote 3), because a homeowner unable to pay but with positive home equity may want to sell his home 
to pay the loan (and thereby retain his home equity) rather than invite foreclosure.  Liebowitz (2009) finds 
that negative equity was a more important factor than unemployment in causing the foreclosures that 
occurred in the second half of 2008.  Geanakopolos and Koniak (2009) find that foreclosures are 
“stunningly sensitive” to the amount of home equity.   3
Lenders have modified the terms of some of their mortgages or otherwise 
modified payments associated with mortgages in order to avoid foreclosure, both in this 
recession and previous recessions.
6  However, some mortgage industry participants have 
complained that too few mortgage modifications occur because of the excessive 
transaction costs in dealing with individual homeowner situations and dealing with 
investors who have varied stakes in the mortgage payments.
7 
 
Public Sector Modification Formulas Feature Marginal Tax Rates in Excess of 100% 
The Bush Administration took steps to streamline the consideration of individual 
homeowner circumstances.  In 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
Federal National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation all announced debt forgiveness or “loan modification” formulas.  The 
Obama Administration continued this work with its “Homeowner Affordability and 
Stability Plan” (HASP) by offering subsidies to mortgage servicers and brokers who 
participate in mortgage modifications. 
The FDIC’s early plan said “Modifications would be designed to achieve 
sustainable payments at a 38 percent debt-to-income ratio of principal, interest, taxes, and 
insurance.” (FDIC, 2008)  Several major mortgage servicers such as Bank of America, 
JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup used those formulas for some of their delinquent 
borrowers.  For example, Citigroup and the U.S. Treasury announced November 24
th, 
2008: 
“Citigroup will modify mortgages to help people avoid foreclosure along the lines 
of an FDIC plan that was put into effect at IndyMac Bank… struggling home borrowers 
pay interest rates of about three percent for five years. Rates are reduced so that 
borrowers aren't paying more than 38 percent of their pretax income on housing.” 
(Aversa, 2008) 
 
                                                 
6 Sichelman (2001) discusses modifications during the 2001 recession.  In their study of 32 million 
mortgages, the Office of Thrift Supervision (2009) found that about three percent were either modified or 
put on a payment plan during 2008, although the three percent double-counts mortgages that received 
multiple home retention actions during the year.  Modification have occurred at a higher rate in 2009, and 
the Obama administration intends to modify several million of them. 
7 Eggert (2007), Geanakoplos and Koniak (2008).  Nevertheless, most servicers are permitted to modify 
loans (Foote et al, 2009).  Foote et al (2009) even find that the propensity to modify mortgages is 
uncorrelated with whether the mortgages are owned by the servicer.   4
The Obama Administration has proposed essentially the same formula, except that 
housing costs would be limited to 31 (rather than 38) percent of pretax income.   
Hereafter, I refer to these two plans collectively as FDIC-HASP. 
The FDIC-HASP plan massively distorts the supply of income-earning efforts, 
because its mortgage modification is large and means-tested: its formula implies that an 
action taken by a borrower to increase his income would increase his housing payment 
obligation by 31 percent of the income increment.
8  If the affordable payment (i.e., the 
payment that would comprise 31 percent of income) were re-evaluated monthly, this 
would amount to a 31 percent marginal tax rate in each month that a modification could 
occur. 
Standard practice determines an affordable payment based on the most recent 
year’s income, and puts that payment in place for five years (recall the Citigroup practice 
cited above).  Thus, a marginal dollar earned in the base year raises mortgage payment 
obligations by 31 cents in each of the following five years.  If, say, 2009 income were 
used to calculate an affordable payment for the years 2010-14 and the interest rate were 
zero, then the marginal tax rate would be 155 percent for 2009 (5 times the formula’s 
0.31 limit on the payment to income ratio) and zero thereafter.  Hereafter I assume an 
annual interest rate of 6 percent, which means that the marginal tax rate would be 131 
percent for 2009.
9  Moreover, underwater mortgages are ubiquitous enough that FDIC-
HASP mortgage modification could produce distortions that are large enough to be 
visible in the national employment data, or at least visible in the employment data of the 
                                                 
8 It is well known that the common practice of collecting college tuition according to ability to pay creates 
work disincentives.  Dick and Edlin (1997) estimated that college tuitions with annual list prices in the 
range $5,000 - $10,000 created marginal income tax rates in the range of 2 – 16 percent.  As ratios to 
potential income, these amounts are small compared to the amounts mortgage lenders have to collect today.  
Thus, it should be no surprise that underwater mortgage debt collection creates large marginal tax rates.   









⎝⎠ ∑ .  To the extent that payment 
reductions last more than five years – U.S. Treasury (2009, pp. 2-3) has said “[the] lower interest rate must 
be kept in place for five years, after which it could gradually be stepped up to the conforming loan rate in 
place at the time of the modification.” – the marginal tax rate would be even larger.  The personal income 
tax treatment of mortgage modification could also affect a modification’s implicit marginal tax rate.  For 
the purpose of this paper, the finding that the rate exceeds 100 percent is more critical than its magnitude.   5
worse hit states.  Means-tested mortgage modification has created a massive implicit tax 
that is significant even from a macroeconomic perspective.
10 
 
Related Literature and Outline of this Paper 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the degree to which it is in lenders’ and 
the public’s interest to adopt collection policies that create moral hazard in the labor 
market in order to reduce foreclosures in the housing market.  The paper compares 
housing and labor market outcomes under three collection policies: (a) FDIC-HASP’s 
means-tests, (b) the policy that maximizes collections, and (c) the policy that maximizes 
collections subject to the “non-discrimination” constraint that modifications are not 
conditioned on borrower income.  The first two collection policies create, to varying 
degrees, moral hazard in the labor market, whereas the last does not. 
The collection-maximizing policy is characterized by posing the collection 
problem as an optimal price discrimination program, and using the tools of optimal tax 
theory to characterize the solution.
11  It is quite possible that the means-tested mortgage 
modification policy that maximizes lender objectives would – relative to a world where 
mortgage modification is not conditioned on borrower income – harm the public interest 
and have little impact on foreclosures.
12  Moreover, marginal tax rates on the order of 130 
percent – present in the FDIC-HASP plan – are beyond those that maximize collections, 
and further harm the public interest.  The FDIC-HASP plan in many cases creates more 
foreclosures than do the policies that maximize collections, with or without means tests. 
                                                 
10 Foote et al (2008, p. 243 and footnote 29) point out that “modification leads to a serious moral hazard 
problem” and that even homeowners who are not certain that modification will be available may still react 
to the possible means-test by not working, because the modification rewards for low income are so large. 
  Some affected borrowers may not have anticipated that they would face a marginal tax rate in 
excess of 100%.  However, if borrowers generally understand that creditors will sometimes modify 
according to ability-to-pay but do not know exactly when a modification formula will apply, then some 
borrowers may behave ex ante as if they faced a high marginal tax rate even though ex poste they received 
no forgiveness. 
11 Grochulski (2008) models personal bankruptcy negotiations as a mechanism design problem akin to 
Mirrlees (1971), but Grochulski’s study is “not designed to replicate any particular set of facts about the 
structure of actual credit markets or bankruptcy laws,” (p. 29).  Mulligan (2008) uses a Mirrlees approach 
(with two types) to relate unsecured debt collection to employment 1929-33 and 2008.  Neither of these 
papers report results related to the tradeoff between foreclosures and moral hazard in the labor market, and 
how public policies affect those tradeoffs. 
12 This result is reminiscent of Chiang and Spatt’s (1982) finding that third-degree price discrimination can 
result in less welfare than no discrimination, although they find this possibility because (unlike here) they   6
  Kahn and Yavas (1994) is an early paper modeling foreclosures as the “outside 
option” in a mortgage renegotiation.  This aspect of renegotiation was studied further by 
Livshits et al (2007), White and Zhu (2008), but still considering borrower income as an 
exogenous characteristic – and therefore not studying the tradeoff between foreclosures 
and moral hazard in the labor market.  Han and Li (2007) consider the combined wealth 
and substitution effects of mortgage modification on labor supply, but do not attempt to 
separate them or calculate a labor market deadweight cost of modifications.  Given that 
the “wealth” effect of writing down a mortgage is a transfer from lenders to borrowers, 
netting out the wealth effect is important even for positive analysis of the aggregate 
effects. 
Fisher (1933), Mishkin (1978), Bernanke and Gertler (1983), Kroszner (1999) and 
others have noted that household balance sheets seem to be correlated with the business 
cycle and have offered theoretical interpretations of this correlation.  However, their 
models operate on an investment or intertemporal margin, whereas my model operates on 
the consumption-effort margin.  They model a problem with the intermediation of new 
loans, whereas I model a problem with settling the old ones. 
  Section I begins by deriving the budget set facing borrowers who might be 
eligible for mortgage modification according to the FDIC-HASP formula.  The budget set 
vividly illustrates how means-tested modification can destroy income-earning incentives.  
Section II models the economic environment, and shows how the collection-maximizing 
modification policy is a special case of mechanism design or optimal tax theory.  The 
supplies of income earning effort under the three collection policies are derived and 
compared in Section III.  Section IV derives and compares foreclosure rates under the 
three collection policies.  Section V concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity: price discrimination correlated with one dimension can 
harm sorting in the other.   7
I.  The Budget Set of a Borrower Facing the FDIC-HASP Modification Formula 
In order to see more precisely how means-tested mortgage modification affects 
incentives, it helps to consider the shape of borrower budget sets with and without   
means-tested mortgage modification.  Let time t = 0 be the period (some time after the 
loan was granted) during which income is measured for the purpose of modification, 
which modifies loan payments in periods t = 1, 2, ….  At times t = 0, 1, …, the borrower 
consumes ct at and expends effort nt.  Effort nt produces taxable income – that is, income 
that can be observed by the lender
13 – in the amount ntwt.  The entire commodity space is 
{c0,n0,c1,n1,c2,n2, …}, but analysis of it can be simplified by assuming a present value 
budget constraint and considering the tradeoff between effort at time zero (hereafter, n) 
and the present value of all other expenditure (hereafter, c).  a denotes the amount that 
could be consumed if period zero income were zero and home equity were zero. 
 
I.A. Foreclosure Costs 
Consider three scenarios for the borrower: (i) payments are made in full 
(according to the loan’s original terms), (ii) he walks away from the home and mortgage, 
or (iii) the bank unconditionally writes down his mortgage so that it is no longer 
underwater.
14  Each scenario by itself presents the borrower with a linear budget 
constraint with slope –1 (see Figure 1, in which borrow income nw is shown increasing 
from right to left), but the scenarios differ in terms of the budget constraint’s intercept.  
Because the mortgage is underwater, the full payment scenario (i) has intercept closer to 
                                                 
13 In practice, lenders consider borrower personal income tax returns, which means that the income concept 
relevant for mortgage modification is similar in character and timing to the taxable income relevant for 
income tax policy analysis.  Thus, effort includes not only hours worked but also truthful reporting to the 
IRS, occupational choice, etc. (Feldstein, 1999) 
14 In practice, mortgages are modified by some or all of the following: (i) reduced interest rate, (ii) reduced 
principal, postponement (without interest) of delinquent principal and interest payments, (iv) extended 
amortization (Sichelman, 2001; U.S. Treasury, February 2009).  For my purposes – analysis of the 
consequences of a presumably permanent housing price crash -- all of these can be summarized in terms of 
the present value of payments to be made after the loan is modified (Kahn and Yavas, 1994, also take this 
approach).  Modifications that result from temporary shocks could have different effects depending on 
whether principal or interest is modified (Foote et al, 2009).   8
the origin than the write-down scenario (iii).  Under the foreclosure scenario
15 (ii), the 
homeowner surrenders the house, has his mortgage erased, and incurs foreclosure costs. 
Foreclosure costs include moving costs, the moral hazard related to maintenance 
(created when a home’s occupant is not its owner), and lost access to credit markets.
16  
The c-intercept of the foreclosure scenario (ii) is closer to the origin than the write-down 
scenario (iii) by the amount of foreclosure costs, but its position relative to the full 
payment scenario depends on the relative comparison of the amount underwater and the 
amount of foreclosure costs.  If all borrowers had foreclosure costs that exceeded the 
amount underwater, then all borrowers would prefer to pay in full than to be foreclosed.  
The interesting cases have a significant number of borrowers for whom the amount 
underwater is greater than the foreclosure cost: in terms of Figure 1, the foreclosure 
scenario has intercept in between those of the other two scenarios. 
 
I.B.  Means-tests 
Figure 2 shows how means-tested modification presents the borrower with a 
budget constraint in the [-nw, c] plane that is in between the solid line and the outside 
dashed line in Figure 1 (the straight solid and dashed lines are identical in the two 
figures).  Consider first the allocation X in which the borrower puts forth no effort (in 
period zero) and consumes the amount a – b while making full mortgage payments.  At 
the allocation Z, the borrower also puts forth no effort, but makes no payments and is 
foreclosed.  At the allocation Z0, the mortgage is written down so that it is no longer 
underwater; the distance between X and Z0 is the amount underwater, b. 
                                                 
15 Because the mortgage is assumed to be under water, I do not distinguish between foreclosure, “walking 
away,” and “deed in lieu of foreclosure.”  I refer to all three as “foreclosure” and assume that they result in 
the payment of deadweight “foreclosure costs.” 
16 I model foreclosure costs as if they are entirely paid by borrowers.  This is just a normalization, achieved 
by defining the amount of negative equity b to be the par value of the mortgage minus the value of the 
home to the bank in the case of foreclosure.   9
At allocation X, (period 0) income is zero and mortgage payments are made in 
full, which means that mortgage payments are more than 31 percent of income.  The 
allocation Y indicates the amount of effort that must be supplied in order for the borrower 
to have income that equals yY  ≡ (full housing payments)/0.31 (that is, full housing 
payments are equal to 31 percent of income).  Thus, under the FDIC-HASP modification, 
no allocation to the left of Y would be eligible for modification.  The budget constraint 
for underwater borrowers therefore includes the segment OY. 
The borrower’s budget set has to include the allocation Z, because foreclosure and 
not working are among his options.  Even without knowing the exact location of the 
budget set’s boundary between allocation Y and Z, we know that (unlike the segment OY) 
its average slope has to be less than one in magnitude.  This on-average flattening of the 
budget constraint’s slope is the fundamental reason why means-tested mortgage 
modification reduces incentives to earn the income that would be used in the 
modification formula. 
As noted above, at point Y, the present value of mortgage payments falls $1.31 for 
each dollar that income is reduced.  Because consumption is income minus mortgage 
payments, consumption therefore increases $0.31 for each dollar that income falls.
17  The 
31% mortgage modification formula therefore creates an upward sloping budget 
constraint slope, at least for incomes near and below the income corresponding to 
allocation Y. 
 
I.C.  The Minimum Income Threshold 
The Bush and Obama Administrations have not provided modification formula 
details for incomes far below the income corresponding to allocation Y, but a few things 
are clear.  First, the upward slope rarely continues to the point where income is zero, 
because that would involve eliminating all mortgage payments for five years, which in 
most cases would cause the present value of the modified mortgage’s payments to be 
                                                 
17 It is coincidence and rounding error that the slope of the budget constraint is equal to the percentage used 
in the mortgage modification rule.  For example, a percentage of 38 (as under the Bush Administration) 
implies an implicit tax rate of 160% and budget constraint slope of +0.6.   10
significantly less than the home’s market value.
18  Given that allocations above and to the 
right of the outside dashed line would make the lender worse off than would foreclosure, 
it is unlikely that mortgage modification would present borrowers with a budget 
constraint that included such allocations.  A good guess is that there is a threshold income 
yW with two properties: (i) underwater mortgages are eligible for modification if and only 
the borrower’s income is in between yW and yY, and (ii) the amount paid by borrowers 
with exactly income yW is at least equal to the market value of the house.
19 
Figure 2 draws the case in which borrowers earning at the lower income threshold 
pay exactly the market value of the house; the allocation W0 indicates the allocation 
where the income earned is such that exactly b must be written down in order for 
mortgage payments to be reduced enough that housing payments are 31 percent of 
income.
20  The complete budget constraint is OYW0WZ. 
Section  WW0Z of the budget constraint depends on the foreclosure cost, and 
therefore may vary across borrowers, even among borrowers with the same b.  The length 
of segment W0W is equal to the amount of the foreclosure cost. 
 
I.D.  Borrower Reactions to FDIC-HASP 
Assuming that borrower indifference curves slope down in the plane shown in 
Figure 2 (and ignoring optimization error), the distribution of repayments net of home 
values induced by budget constraint is OYW0WZ is degenerate, with all of its mass at two 
points: 0 and b.  Some of the borrowers repaying zero would have the unsecured part of 
their mortgages written down by b, the others would choose the foreclosure option.  The 
induced income distribution would also have a mass point (corresponding to the lower 
income threshold), and would have holes both to the right and left of that mass point. 
                                                 
18 A mortgage with 25 years remaining and rate fixed at six percent has about one third of the present value 
of its remaining payments come due during the first five years. 
19 I have seen press reports that some borrowers are being denied modification because their incomes are 
too low.  More recently, the press has also reported (Rucker, 2009) that the Obama Administration may 
propose to allow unemployed people to become renters in their own home.  If those people had an 
underwater mortgage, that would be represented in Figure 2 as including the allocation Z0 as part of the 
budget set. 
20 A larger amount for the lower income threshold would shorten the segment YW0 so that it ends below the 
outer dashed line.   11
As compared to a world with no mortgage modification (lenders foreclose on 
anyone paying less than  the full amount of the loan), the FDIC-HASP plan reduces 
foreclosures by inducing some of those with m < b to choose the point W0, rather than 
foreclosure, which would be an allocation somewhere on the linear extension of the 
segment WZ in Figure 2.  However, the FDIC-HASP plan does not necessarily eliminate 
foreclosures, because some borrowers may prefer an allocation on the segment WZ to the 
point W0. 
With the exception of point W0, any utility-maximizing choice on the segments 
YW0 or W0W is socially inefficient because it does not equate w to the marginal rate of 
substitution between c and n.  Even at W0, the marginal rate of substitution would equal 
one only by an unlikely coincidence: many other marginal rates of substitution are also 
consistent with an optimal choice W0. 
FDIC-HASP will likely induce too little effort, because (as noted above) the 
average slope is less than one in magnitude on the section YW0WZ.  However, depending 
on the relative size of the foreclosure costs and the amount underwater, as compared to 
the slopes of indifference curves, it is possible that some borrowers would increase their 
effort in order to earn above the minimum threshold and thereby be eligible for 
modification.  This outcome is impossible if the allocation W0 is on the segment XZ0, or if 
the threshold income associated with W0 is enough higher than shown in Figure 2 (so that 




II. A Simple Model of Foreclosure, Debt Forgiveness and Effort Distortions 
I.A.  Setup and Outcomes without Means-tests 
  Each individual of a group of ex ante identical borrowers obtains a collateralized 
loan.  Initially, the value of the collateral exceeds the amount lent.  Some time after the 
beginning of the loan, but before its final payment, the borrowers experience a common 
change in their collateral value.  Of particular interest is the case in which collateral 
values fall short of the amount owed.  I let b denote the amount of negative home equity, 
                                                 
21 The income associated with allocation W is less than the income associated with Y.  Allocation Y is 
associated with a house payment-income ratio of 0.31, which itself is greater than the actual ratio for most 
borrowers.  Thus, section OYW0 is more relevant for most borrowers choices than is segment W0W.   12
which is sometimes referred to as the “amount underwater” or the “unsecured part of the 
mortgage.” 
In addition, each borrower has received an idiosyncratic shock to his privately 
observed labor productivity w.  Distribution of productivities resulting from those shocks 
is F, with density f and support [wL,wH].  I assume that F’s inverse Mills ratio has an 
elasticity greater than minus one.
22 
Each individual produces the product of his effort n and his productivity w.  Each 
individual has a utility function u(c,n) defined over consumption c and work effort n.  
Following much of the literature on the optimal taxation of heterogeneous agents, I 
assume that u(c,n) is additively separable and satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees condition.
23  
Some of that literature also assumes that the function is quasilinear in c – an assumption 
that is even more realistic here because c is a broad composite of many goods, including 
leisure time at future dates.















where γ > 0 and φ ≥ 0 are constants.  1/φ is often interpreted as the inverse of the 
elasticity of effort supply n with respect to productivity w: the efficient effort supply is 
n
*(w) = w
1/φ/γ.  Given that φ ≥ 0, the Spence-Mirrlees condition is necessarily satisfied.  
Note that I do not restrict the magnitude of the effort supply elasticity, except that it be 
positive.
25 
  Without means tests, borrowers have simply the choice of foreclosure or paying 
the amount x ≤ b requested by their lender.  Such a borrower i has budget constraint: 
                                                 







> ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
.  It is satisfied, for example, by the logistic 
distribution and the uniform distribution. 
23 See Salanié (2003, pp. 87-88), including an analysis of the Spence-Mirrlees condition for the quasilinear 
case. 
24 See, for example, Mulligan (2001), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007), and Chetty and Saez (2009).  A utility 
function that recognized wealth effects on effort would find them from transfers between borrowers and 
lenders, which would be exaggerated relative to a more realistic (and complicated) setup in which 
borrowers owned shares in the banks that were doing the lending.  
25 In particular, I do not assume that means tests necessarily have a large effort effect.  Moreover, a small 
effort effects can have large deadweight costs.   13
 min{ , } iii i i caw n m x = +−  (2) 
 
where a represents sources of full income other than effort during the period in question 
and mi > 0 denotes borrow i’s foreclosure cost (“m” is for “moving”).
26  The cross-
sectional distribution of foreclosure costs is denoted G. 
  The borrower’s choice to repay x or incur mi has efficiency consequences.  mi is a 
deadweight cost, whereas x is a transfer from borrower to lender.  Reduction in the 
amount x to be repaid is one way that borrowers could be induced to repay rather than 
choose foreclosure: fraction of borrowers who prefer repaying x rather than foreclosure is 
1-G(x). 
In other words, lenders face a tradeoff between the unsecured amount x to be 
repaid and the fraction 1-G(x) of borrowers who repay.  As shown by Figure 3’s 
monotone curve, the mirror image of the foreclosure cost CDF illustrates the tradeoff 
because it maps payment amounts on the vertical axis to the fraction of borrowers on the 
horizontal axis who would prefer that payment amount to their foreclosure cost.  In other 
words, the lender’s choice of repayment amount is a choice of a point on that “demand 
curve.”  Unsecured debt collection therefore has a lot of analytics in common with the 
standard model of monopoly pricing where a monopolist faces a tradeoff between the 
amount sold and the profit obtained from each unit sold. 
Assuming that the constraint x ≤ b does not bind, the single unsecured repayment 

















Without discriminating, the collection maximizing foreclosure rate is G(x0). 
                                                 
26 I assume that foreclosure costs are nonnegative.  If some borrowers had a negative foreclosure cost, than 
foreclosure would be efficient for them. 
27 The possible corner solutions for x0 are b and the lower support of the distribution G.   14
  The non-discrimination outcome has two interesting properties.  First, a lender 








.  Second, for 
those lenders that choose to write down everyone’s debt, the preferred amount of 
foreclosure depends on the shape of the foreclosure cost distribution G, and not the 
amount  b that mortgages are unsecured.  These results are used below to compare 
collection-maximizing outcomes to outcomes under FDIC-HASP. 
 
I.B.  Debt Forgiveness as Mechanism Design 
  Because each borrower has the choice of foreclosure and making the payment x 
requested by the lender, and borrowers are different, lenders could benefit (relative to the 
non-discrimination outcome above) by determining which borrowers have the high 
foreclosure costs and asking them to repay more.  The foreclosure rate is zero in this case 
because the lender is better off collecting mi > 0 from borrower i than foreclosing.  This 
“perfect discrimination” case proves that it is possible for a discriminating debt collection 
policy to reduce foreclosures from what they would be without discrimination. 
To the degree that foreclosure costs are private information, perfect 
discrimination may not be feasible.  This makes the lender’s collection-maximization 
problem a case of optimal third-degree price discrimination, or more generally a case of 
optimal mechanism design.  Here I consider the environment – familiar from the optimal 
tax literature – in which each borrower’s effort n and foreclosure cost m are private 
information, but his income wn is public.  Henceforth, I also assume that the private 
information is one-dimensional: foreclosure costs are a monotone, increasing, and 
continuous function m(w) of productivity.
28  In determining the required payments to 
avoid foreclosure, lenders can discriminate among borrowers on the basis of the amount 
of home equity -b and the amount of their income wn. 
For each group of borrowers with the same home equity, the amount of revenue 
collected on the unsecured part of their mortgages is: 
                                                 
28 To the degree that foreclosure costs are costs of nonmarket time and hassle, they would increase with 
market productivity w.  It is also possible that higher productivity individuals place a greater absolute value 
on future credit market access, because they expect their future credit market transactions to be of greater 
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where y is income, x(y) is the payment schedule, and H is the income distribution.  As is 
well known in the mechanism design literature, this statement of the lender’s collection 
problem is pretty intractable because the income distribution H depends on the payment 
schedule.  The revelation principle permits an equivalent statement of the problem in the 
space of productivities.  In this version, each type w is assigned an amount of effort n(w) 
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Participation constraints (6) say that each w of those making a payment prefers his 




(( ) ( ) , ( ) ) ( )
() m a x m i n () , , g i v e n () ,,
ua w nw xw nw uw






where u is the utility function (1).  As indicated, the outside option depends on the cost of 
foreclosure m(w) and the par value b of the unsecured part of the loan. 
A series (7) of incentive constraints require that each borrower prefer his 
allocation (which is his choice between the modification and effort assigned to him, or 
paying in full, or foreclosure) to earning the income associated with some other modified 
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The constraints (7) are of the same form as in the classic Mirrlees (1971) optimal tax 
problem, and represent the means-tests that may enhance collections.  Any borrower w 
has to earn income ωn(ω) in order to be eligible for the payment amount x(ω).  The 
incentive constraint requires that the payment amount x(ω) not be so low that type w 
would choose to earn ωn(ω) rather than wn(w). 
Lenders cannot ask borrowers to pay more than b or supply less than zero effort: 
 
  () ,() 0 xw bnw ≤ ≥  (8) 
 
Lenders choose effort and repayment profiles n(w) and x(w), respectively, to maximize 
(5) subject to the constraints (6), (7), and (8). 
  Given a solution to the collection-maximization program, equilibrium effort 
profiles n(w) and income profiles y(w) are calculated from the program for those types 
receiving modified payments, and as the efficient effort for those types foreclosed or 
paying in full.  A collection schedule x(y) supporting the equilibrium is calculated by 
inverting the income profile y(w) and substituting it into the payment profile x(w).
29 
The first step in finding a solution the collection-maximization program is to 
guess as to which of the many incentive constraints bind.  As in the classic Mirrlees 
problem, there may be an interval [w2,w3] of the productivity distribution over which only 
the local incentive constraints bind, and in the downward direction.  In other words, each 
type  w  ∈ [ w2,w3] will be indifferent between his own income and repayment 
(wn(w),x(w)) and the income and repayment assigned by the lender to someone with 
marginally less productivity.  He will strictly prefer his income and repayment to the 
                                                 
29 I refer to mappings from productivity to outcomes as “profiles” and mappings from incomes to outcomes 
as “schedules.”  As shown below, the optimal income profile will be invertible, except over ranges in 
which the payment profile x is constant.     17
income and repayment assigned to all other types.  On this interval, the binding incentive 
constraints have a differential form: 
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where un denotes the marginal disutility of effort, which depends on the level of effort. 
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Over intervals of the productivity distribution in which payments are independent of 
income – such as those in which foreclosures occur or full payments are made – the local 
incentive constraints do not bind. 
The participation constraint is less familiar from the optimal tax literature, but 
may create an interval over which the local incentive constraints above do not bind and 
global constraints do.  For example, it may be optimal to induce a mass point in the 
income distribution: a range of productivities all assigned the same income and 
repayment.  An income mass point is especially likely for the productivities on the 
margin of foreclosure because those choosing foreclosure are on a portion of the budget 
constraint with slope w in the [n,c] plane (slope 1 in the [y,c] plane) whereas those 
making payments may face a lesser slope due to the means test.  In this case, the binding 
incentive constraints can be represented as: 
 
  22 1 2 () ( ) , [ , ] wn w w n w w w w ≤ ∈  (11) 
 
  Although the FDIC-HASP plan may not obtain the maximum lender collections, 
the allocation it induces does help illustrate some of the incentive and participation 
constraints that restrict collections.  FDIC-HASP induces an allocation that can be 
described by partitions of the productivity distribution at two points w1 > w2.  Those with 
productivity in bottom interval [wL,w1] repay none of the (unsecured part of) their   18
mortgage and are foreclosed; they choose allocations on the segment WZ in Figure 2.  
The participation constraint binds on this interval.  Those in the interval [w1,w2] all earn 
the same income and repay the same amount to the lender; they choose the allocation W0 
in Figure 2.  The incentive constraints (11) bind on this interval.  Participation constraints 
bind on the interval [w2,wH], where the borrowers repay in full. 
None of the local incentive constraints bind under the FDIC-HASP, which by 
itself suggests that it is not maximizing collections.  Figure 3 illustrates this result with its 
“demand curve” analogy.  The FDIC-HASP collection profile (not shown in the Figure) 
would simply be two horizontal lines: one at the left at vertical position b, and a second in 
the middle horizontally, and at vertical position corresponding to the minimum payment 
xmin on the unsecured part of the mortgage that is accepted by FDIC-HASP.
30  Figure 3’s 
red curve also includes two horizontal lines, but potentially enhances revenue by having a 
gradual transition from full payment b to the minimum payment amount.
31 
  The collection-maximizing mechanism may include as many as four productivity 
intervals partitioned by w1 > w2 > w3.  Three of those intervals are qualitatively the same 
as under FDIC-HASP: [wL,w1], [w1,w2], and [w3,wH].
32  But the collection-maximum may 
also involve an interval absent from FDIC-HASP: the interval [w2,w3] with a gradually-
sloping repayment profile and binding local incentive constraints (9). 
The participation constraints are automatically satisfied on the interval [wL,w1], 
because those types are foreclosed.  If a participation constraint were binding in the 
interval [w1,w2], then it can only bind at w1 because (among those in the interval) that 
type supplies the most effort.
33  The utility surplus relative to foreclosure could either rise 
or fall with productivity on the interval [w2,w3], depending on the foreclosure cost 
gradient on that interval and the marginal tax rates that satisfy the first order conditions. 
                                                 
30 Recall that Figure 2 is drawn with the assumption that FDIC-HASP would (depending on borrower 
income) accept as little as zero payment on the unsecured part of the mortgage. 
31 With perfect information the collection-maximizing repayment profile would follow the foreclosure cost 
distribution.  Otherwise, the incentive and participation constraints require that Figure 3’s red repayment 
curve be below the “demand curve” and slope downward sufficiently slowly. 
32 The collection-maximizing numerical values for w1 and w2 do not necessarily coincide with those from 
the FDIC-HASP plan.  It is also possible that some of the intervals [wL,w1], [w1,w2], [w2,w3], or [w3,wH] 
must be degenerate in order to maximize collections. 
33 The utility surplus relative to foreclosure also rises with productivity on the interval [w3,wH] because all 
types are paying the same x3 and have undistorted effort whereas foreclosure costs are rising with 
productivity.   19
Suppose the participation constraint were binding at w1.  Even if the surplus were 
lower at w3 than at w2 (where it would be strictly positive), it might still be positive at w3.  
Thus, I proceed by assuming that participation binds only at w1 and then confirm that the 
proposed solution satisfies the participation constraint at w3, in which case the 
participation constraint would be satisfied everywhere.
34  Income cannot jump down at 
w1,
35 and foreclosure does not distort the supply of effort, so the participation constraint is 
simply x1 = min{m(w1),b}. 
Assuming for the moment that the participation constraint does not bind at w3 and 
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The choice variables are x(•) ≤ b, n(•) ≥ 0, x3 ≤ b, w1∈ [wL,wH] and w3 ∈ [wL,wH].  Given 
w1 and w3, w2 is inferred from smooth pasting (i.e., that w2n(w2) is the same regardless of 
whether it is calculated from above or below). 
The Lagrangian’s first three terms are repayments in three intervals of 
productivity in which borrowers make some repayment, imposing the participation 
constraint x1 = m(w1) and the (global) incentive constraints x(w) = x1 for all w ∈ [w1,w2].  
The Lagrangian’s last term combines the various local incentive constraints that bind in 
the interval [w2,w3]; each local constraint has multiplier q(w).
36 
                                                 
34 Because the shape of the foreclosure cost function m(w) affects the solution proposed below only at w1, a 
proposed solution could be made to satisfy the participation constraint at w3 merely by assuming that the 
foreclosure cost function were steep enough on (w1,w3]. 
35 If income jumped down at w1, constraint (11) would be violated: some of those with productivity less 
than w1 would prefer to earn the same as a person with productivity greater than w1 because doing so takes 
less effort and makes them eligible for modification. 
36 The multipliers are q(w) = 0 on (w3,wH].   20
Substitution for the utility surplus on [w2,w3] changes the Lagrangian from (12) 
to: 
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The Lagrangian (13) is rising in x3, unless w3 = wH, which proves 
 
Proposition 1 The collection-maximizing payment profile x(w) either forgives all 
borrowers (x(w) < b for all w) or requires full payment b from an interval of borrowers 
[w3,wH]. 
 
From the first order condition with respect to x(w), w ∈ [w2,w3], the multiplier on 
their local incentive constraint must be q(w) = f(w).  It follows that the co-state variable 
Q(w) is F(w3) – F(w). 
  The first order conditions with respect to effort n(w) help describe the effects of 
unsecured debt collection on the labor market.  The conditions with respect to w1 and w3 
help describe the effects of unsecured debt collection on foreclosures. 
 
 
III. The Labor Market with Maximum Collections, FDIC-HASP, and No 
Discrimination 
 
Effort supply is efficient (n(w) = w
1/φ/γ) on [wL,w1] and [w3,wH].  On the interval 
[w1,w2], all borrowers have the same income, so n(w) = n(w1)w1/w.  Collection-
maximizing effort on [w2,w3] is found from the first order condition with respect to n(w), 
so the collection-maximizing effort profile is: 
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Another way to describe the collection-maximizing effort profile is in terms of the 
marginal tax rate: the percentage gap between productivity and the marginal rate of 
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The collection-maximizing marginal tax rate profile is shown in Figure 4.  It is zero on 
[wL,w1] and [w3,wH], rising on [w1,w2], and falling on [w2,w3].  Not surprisingly, 
collection-maximizing marginal tax rates fall with the elasticity 1/φ of effort supply with 
respect to productivity.  The formula (15) proves: 
 
Proposition 2 The collection-maximizing marginal tax rate is always less than 100 
percent. 
 
  There exists a payment schedule x(y), with x′(y) ≤ 0 and x(y) ≤ b that supports the 
collection-maximizing allocation described above.  In other words, this payment schedule 
represents a series of means-tests: lesser payments are required from borrowers with 
lesser incomes, and only those (if any) with the highest incomes are required to pay in 
full.  When enough of the mortgage is unsecured (b > m(wL)), collections are maximized 
by modifying the mortgages, with means-tested conditions for modification.   22
  The collection-maximizing payment schedule x(y) can be calculated from the 
results above by integrating the marginal tax rates in the space of incomes.  The integral 
does not generally have a closed form solution, but we know that it is constant over 
productivity intervals in which the marginal tax rate is zero and incomes are rising, 
constant over the interval [w1,w2], and falling less than one-for-one over the interval 
[w2,w3].  This means that the budget constraint induced by the collection-maximizing 
policy has a shape like in Figure 5: sloping downward throughout, linear for the highest 
and lowest incomes, and concave in the middle.
37 
Compare Figures 2 and 5.  Both plans induce budget constraints that have a kink 
like the one at point W.  The FDIC-HASP plan presents borrowers with marginal tax rates 
that are either zero or 100 percent (or more).
38  The collection-maximizing policy 
presents borrowers with a range of marginal tax rates that includes zero and excludes 100 
percent.  Both plans induce an inefficient amount of effort by at least some of the 
borrowers. 
If lenders were constrained to maximize collections without discriminating – that 
is, demanding a single payment amount x from all borrowers with the same b – then the 
supply of effort would be efficient at all points in the productivity distribution, although 
collections would not be maximized.  Assuming that the constraint x ≤ b does not bind, 
lender-collections are maximized (conditional on non-discrimination) by reducing 














where  G is the distribution of foreclosure costs, which is G(x)  ≡  F(m
-1(x)) when 
foreclosure costs are simply m(w).  All borrowers with m(w) < x0 choose not to pay x0 and 
                                                 
37 All borrowers are presented with the same modification schedule, so the budget constraint is the same for 
incomes above the minimum threshold yW.  Below yW, the constraint depends on the foreclosure cost, which 
varies across borrowers; Figure 5 graphs the case of a borrower with productivity greater than w1. 
38 Assuming that effort is a bad and consumption a good (and ignoring optimization error), any behavior 
induced by budget set with tax rates in excess of 100% can also be induced by a budget set with 100% 
marginal tax rates.   23
are foreclosed; the collection-maximizing foreclosure rate without discrimination is 
F(m
-1(x0)). 
  When lenders can discriminate, more is collected and effort is distorted. 
Collections are just a transfer from borrowers to lenders, so means-tests have a 
deadweight cost in the form of inefficient effort supply.  Foreclosures are also a 
deadweight cost, so the next question to address is whether means-tests reduce 
foreclosures at all, and enough to offset the effort distortions. 
 
 
IV. Foreclosures and Deadweight Costs Under the Three Policies 
Because the FDIC-HASP plan modifies some of the mortgages, it creates fewer 
foreclosures (and more effort distortion) than a collection policy that demanded payment 
in full.  However, that full-payment counterfactual is of limited relevance because it is 
likely not in lenders’ interest.  The purpose of this section is to quantify the relative 
foreclosures and deadweight costs under three collection policies: FDIC-HASP, 
collection-maximizing with discrimination, and collection-maximizing without 
discrimination.  The results depend on the amount b of negative equity, so the results are 
stated conditional on a particular value – or range of values – for b, and summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
IV.A.  Collection-Maximizing Foreclosures, without Discrimination 
Recall that the number r0 of foreclosures consistent with the non-discriminatory 
collection-maximizing policy is r0 = F(m
-1(min{x0,b})), where x0 is the payment 
satisfying the unit elasticity condition (3) and F(m
-1(·)) is the distribution function for 
foreclosure costs.  Even if lenders could not discriminate, they would likely modify 
mortgages because their gain from reducing foreclosures may exceed the lost revenue 
from those willing to pay in full. 
For b ≤ m(wL), the foreclosure rate is zero because all borrowers prefer paying in 
full to foreclosure.  For b ∈ [m(wL),x0], r0 = F(m
-1(b)), which rises with b.  For b > x0, r0 = 
F(m
-1(x0)).  Figure 6’s dotted line graphs the (non-discriminatory) collection-maximizing 
foreclosure rate as a function of b.   24
 
IV.B.  Foreclosures and Home Values under FDIC-HASP 
FDIC-HASP modifies mortgages only for borrowers with incomes in an interval 
[yW,yY].  Borrowers outside that interval either pay in full or invite foreclosure.  If FDIC-
HASP were fully enforced, foreclosures (if any) would result only from households that 
earn less than the minimum income threshold, which likely falls with the amount 









=  (16) 
 
where h is the annual housing payment, b is the amount underwater, xmin is the minimum 
payment (e.g., Figure 2 displays the case of xmin = 0) required from those receiving 
modification, and R the present value of one dollar paid for each of the next five years.
39  
The term in parentheses is the maximum amount that loans will be modified under FDIC-
HASP.  The minimum income threshold yW can be as large as h/0.31, which I assume to 
be large enough that it exceeds the income efficiently supplied by a borrower with 
productivity wL. 
 For  b ≤ m(wL), the foreclosure rate is zero because all borrowers (including those 
earning less than yW) prefer paying in full to foreclosure.  The foreclosure rate could also 
be zero because the income threshold is so low.  Otherwise, as b rises above m(wL), the 
lowest productivity borrowers are foreclosed because that is better for them than full 
payment, and they prefer not to earn as much as yW.  The foreclosure rate in this case is 
F(m
-1(b)), as it is when collections are maximized without discrimination.  The Appendix 
proves: 
 
                                                 
39 I assume that xmin is no larger than the minimum payment m(wL) required by collection maximizers when 
b is close to zero, so that slightly underwater mortgages are eligible for modification under FDIC-HASP.  
Eligibility requirements articulated by the Administration’s internet site (www.makinghomeaffordable.gov; 
see also www.mtgprofessor.com) suggest that modification or refinancing terms (more generous than 
available in the market) are available even for mortgages that are slightly under water. 
   25
Proposition 3  If the minimum foreclosure cost m(wL) is small enough relative to the full 
annual housing payment h that type wL prefers foreclosure to earning enough to be 
eligible for the minimum modified payment required by FDIC-HASP, then, for an 
interval of b including 0 and m(wL), (i) FDIC-HASP results in a foreclosure rate that is at 
least as great as the non-discrimination foreclosure rate and (ii) effort is distorted by 
FDIC-HASP. 
 
The condition of the proposition holds when either m(wL) or the effort supply elasticity 
1/φ are sufficiently small, and must hold if the foreclosure rate under FDIC-HASP were 
known to be positive. 
 For  b small, but larger than xmin, FDIC-HASP offers means-tested modification 
and thereby distorts the supply of effort.  Both collection policies result in the same 
foreclosure rate (see also the “FDIC” and “Non-disc” curves in Figure 6), which may be 
positive or zero depending on how b compares to m(wL).  Thus, in this range, FDIC-
HASP distorts effort without “saving homes,” as compared to the debt collection policy 
that would maximize collections without discrimination. 
For larger b, FDIC-HASP always distorts effort, but the effect of FDIC-HASP on 
the foreclosure rate relative to the non-discrimination policy can be positive or negative 
depending on the sizes of the minimum income threshold yW and the maximum 
foreclosure rate F(m
-1(x0)) under no-discrimination.  When the amount of negative equity 
gets large enough, FDIC-HASP not only distorts the supply of effort in order to avoid 
modifying mortgages for high income borrowers, but it also distorts the supply of effort 
in order to reduce foreclosures below what they would be at smaller amounts of negative 
equity.  All else equal, a reduction in home values in this range will increase the 
likelihood that an already underwater mortgage will avoid foreclosure via FDIC-HASP 
modification because the income threshold yW falls with home values and is binding for 
borrowers on the margin of foreclosure.
40  This is shown in Figure 6 as downward 
sloping sections of the “FDIC” and “FDIC′” curves. 
                                                 
40 A reduction in home values will also increase the fraction of borrowers who are under water, which by 
itself increases foreclosures.  Empirically, home values will be correlated with other determinants of 
foreclosures, which means that the correlation between home values and foreclosures could be negative 
even while the causal effect of home values on foreclosures through FDIC-HASP is positive.   26
Depending on the elasticity properties of the foreclosure cost distribution 
F(m
-1(x)), the FDIC curve could begin to slope down at b greater than x0 (as with Figure 
6’s “FDIC” curve), or less than x0 (as with Figure 6’s “FDIC′” curve).  In the former 
case, FDIC-HASP induces a greater foreclosure rate than would maximizing collections 
without discrimination. 
 
IV.C.  Foreclosures with Collection-Maximizing Means-Tests 
The first order conditions with respect to w1 and w3, and the smooth pasting 
condition, determine the collection-maximizing w1,  w2, and w3.  The collection-
maximizing foreclosure rate is F(w1).  When the constraint x3 ≤ b binds (that is, at least 
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The first condition requires that effort and incomes are continuous functions of w at w = 
w2.  The second condition and third conditions require that, at the optimum, w1 and w3 
have zero marginal effects on collections, respectively.  The Appendix proves 
 
Lemma If  b ≤ m(wL), the optimum is w1 = w2 = w3 = wL. 
 
  Proposition 4 uses these conditions to show that the discrimination that 
maximizes collections can reduce foreclosures, but the discrimination associated with 
FDIC-HASP does not. 
   27
Proposition 4 Over a range for b that begins at, but does not include, b = m(wL), 
foreclosures are zero for the collection-maximizing policy with discrimination, but 
strictly positive for the non-discrimination allocation.  If the minimum foreclosure cost 
m(wL) is small enough relative to the full annual housing payment h that type wL prefers 
foreclosure to earning enough to be eligible for the minimum modified payment required 
by FDIC-HASP, then FDIC-HASP foreclosures are also strictly positive. 
 
Proof   The strictly positive foreclosure rates under FDIC-HASP and non-
discrimination are shown in Proposition 3.  The last condition (17) above is the first order 
condition with respect to w3, which is exactly zero at w1 = w2 = w3 = wL and b = m(wL).  
The middle condition is the derivative of the Lagrangian (13) with respect to w1, divided 
by f(w1), and is equal to –b at w1 = w2 = w3 = wL and b = m(wL).  Thus, a marginal 
increase in b in the neighborhood of b = m(wL) will marginally increase w2 = w3, but w1 
will remain equal to wL. 
 
  The proposition has a lot in common with a familiar proposition in public finance: 
the deadweight cost of the first dollar of income taxation is zero.  To see this, note that 
lenders can collect b without any distortions when b ≤ m(wL), because all borrowers 
would rather pay in full than pay their foreclosure cost.  When b exceeds m(wL) > 0, 
lenders can collect more than m(wL) only by distorting on one margin or another.   
Assuming that the unit elasticity condition (3) does not hold at x = m(wL), the marginal 
deadweight cost of raising revenue by increasing foreclosures (and thereby inducing 
other borrowers to pay more) is strictly positive, whereas the marginal deadweight cost of 
distorting incentives (and thereby raising the amount that high income borrowers pay) is 
zero.  Thus, lenders who can discriminate do not use foreclosures to collect the first 
amounts of revenue.
41 
                                                 
41 Because the deadweight costs of means-tests are convex in the amount collected, efficient revenue 
collection requires that the mix of foreclosures and means tests shift toward foreclosures as the unsecured 
amount owed b increases.  FDIC-HASP does the opposite when b rises: it increases the fraction of 
borrowers at point W0 in Figure 2 not only to obtain more revenue for lenders, but also to reduce 
foreclosures.  Given that FDIC-HASP is less efficient than non-discrimination at small b, its inefficient mix 
of foreclosures and means-tests tends to makes its relative efficiency even worse at large b.   28
  Figure 6’s “C-max” curve displays the comparative statics of the collection-
maximizing foreclosure rate with respect to b, and shows how they compare to the 
comparative statics under the two other collection policies.  Table 1 displays further 
comparative statics for small amounts b of negative equity.  The collection-maximizing 
policy has the least foreclosures, and collects the most.  The non-discrimination policy 
collects the least.  FDIC-HASP has the greatest overall deadweight cost, and does not 
reduce foreclosures relative to either alternative.  The Appendix proves: 
 
Proposition 5 Maximizing collections with discrimination results in more collections, 




V.  Conclusions 
The Bush administration advocated a mortgage modification plan authored by the 
FDIC, which has been tweaked and further promoted by the Obama administration’s 
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.  This paper considers the consequences of 
this FDIC-HASP plan for the supply of effort and the incidence of foreclosures, and 
compares those consequences to those that would occur under a plan that maximizes 
lender collections, and a plan that maximizes lender collections without means-testing. 
All three plans reduce foreclosures as compared to leaving the mortgages 
unmodified.  Although the unmodified-mortgage benchmark aids understanding of the 
economics of mortgage modification, we cannot assume that underwater mortgages 
would go modified absent the FDIC-HASP plan and its means-tests.  Rather, we might 
expect lenders to modify mortgages in a way that enhances their collections.  As 
compared to the collection-maximizing benchmark, the marginal tax rates implicit in the 
FDIC-HASP plan – well over 100 percent – are excessive.  Moreover, FDIC-HASP 
needlessly distorts the supply of effort for borrowers with slightly negative home equity, 
because foreclosure rates among those borrowers would be low (if not zero) under the 
collection-maximizing plans.    29
For some relatively small amounts of negative equity, FDIC-HASP may result in 
more foreclosures and overall deadweight costs than would a plan that maximizes 
collections.  The collection-maximizing plan uses means tests rather than foreclosures to 
obtain small collections from the high income borrowers, based on the fact that (from the 
perspective of a lender and his borrowers) the marginal deadweight costs of mean-tests 
are initially zero whereas the marginal deadweight costs of foreclosures are positive. 
  At first glance, small amounts of negative equity would seem irrelevant today 
because housing prices have fallen so much.  However, even in Nevada where 
underwater mortgages are the most prevalent, “only” half of mortgages are underwater, 
which means that half are not underwater and presumably many are only slightly 
underwater.  The fact that recent declines in home values have coincided with increases 
in the fraction of U.S. mortgages underwater shows that many mortgages are slightly 
underwater.  Thus, even if FDIC-HASP enhanced efficiency for deep underwater 
mortgages (it does not), my result that it harms efficiency for the numerous slightly 
underwater mortgages means that its aggregate efficiency impact could well be negative. 
I have confined my analysis to mortgages, with a basic setup in which one party 
(a “lender”) attempts to collect from a heterogeneous group (“borrowers”), using a threat 
of punishment (“foreclosure”) for nonpayment.  With the housing crash and the 
recession, the unsecured amount to be collected has suddenly increased, and the 
punishment may have lost some of its pain.  As a result, full collections are not made, but 
rather forgiven for those who appear to have the least ability to pay.  This basic setup 
probably has a lot in common with revenue collection efforts elsewhere in the economy, 
such as the collection of trade debts, tax debts, student loans, or tuition payments.   
Indeed, during the writing of this paper, the federal government began to modify student 
loans, with the borrowers who earn less receiving more loan forgiveness (Glater, 2009).  
Thus, while millions of workers have seen massive increases in their marginal tax rates 
during this recession as a result of mortgage modification, additional workers and 
businesses may also have seen significant increases in their marginal tax rates due to 
these other collection efforts. 
Federal mortgage modification programs create excessive marginal tax rates, but 
the use of means-tests in the mortgage modification process would occur even without   30
government intervention because means-tests are in the collectors’ interests.  Positive 
marginal tax rates are thereby created in the private sector, on top of the various income 
taxes and means-tested benefits perennially administered by federal, state, and local 
governments.  These alternative sources of “taxation” were not explicitly considered in 
my model,
42 but a prior economics literature has already shown how tax rates are 
excessive when multiple collectors have access to the same tax base (Olson, 2000).   
Thus, it is ironic that the federal government has raised the implicit marginal tax rates 
associated with mortgage modification, when it would enhance efficiency and its own tax 
collections by unconditionally repudiating some of the private debts, or at least pushing 
private collectors to rely less on means-tests than would be in the collectors’ interest. 
Prohibiting means-tested mortgage modification is not the same as prohibiting 
modification: it’s just that mortgages would have to be modified without means tests.  In 
other words, those borrowers with significantly negative equity would be forgiven 
regardless of whether they were “able” to pay.  In theory, lenders could find it optimal 
(given that they were not permitted to means test) to write down underwater mortgages so 
much that foreclosure rates would ultimately be quite low.  Of course, a large and across-
the-board mortgage write-down would dramatically reduce lender collections, but the 
objectives of efficiency and lender collections are quite different. 
 
                                                 
42 One approach would be to interpret my “productivity” variable w as a wage rate after various (non-
mortgage) taxes.   31
 
VI. Appendix: Proofs of Lemma and Remaining Propositions 
 
Proposition 3  If the minimum foreclosure cost m(wL) is small enough relative to the full 
annual housing payment h that type wL prefers foreclosure to earning enough to be 
eligible for the minimum modified payment required by FDIC-HASP, then, for an 
interval of b including 0 and m(wL), (i) FDIC-HASP results in a foreclosure rate that is at 
least as great as the non-discrimination foreclosure rate and (ii) effort is distorted by 
FDIC-HASP. 
Proof    Under the condition of the proposition, there is a range of productivities 
that includes wL for which the borrowers prefer foreclosure to the allocation W0 (see, for 
Figure 2), and all other borrowers prefer an allocation on the section OYW0 of the budget 
constraint.  Thus, the borrowers foreclosed by FDIC-HASP are limited to those that are 
both in the aforementioned range of productivities and have foreclosure cost less than b; 
the FDIC-HASP foreclosure rate is F(m
-1(b)).  The non-discrimination foreclosure rate is 
F(m
-1(min{b,x0})), which coincides with F(m
-1(b)) for an interval of b including 0 and 
m(wL).  FDIC-HASP’s distorts effort for any b > m(wL) because the distribution of 
productivities is continuous and the point W0 in Figure 2 is strictly preferred to the point 
W. 
 
Lemma If  b ≤ m(wL), the optimum is w1 = w2 = w3 = wL. 
Proof    At the proposed solution w1 = w2 = w3 = wL, the top condition of (17) is 
satisfied because both right and left sides of the equation are one.  The middle condition 
is the derivative of the Lagrangian (13) with respect to w1, divided by f(w1), and is equal 
to –m(wL) at w1 = w2 = w3 = wL.  Thus, the proposed solution maximizes the Lagrangian 
with respect to w1∈ [wL,wH].  By the same reasoning (see the bottom condition of (17)), 
the proposed solution maximizes the Lagrangian with respect to w3 ∈ [wL,wH] because b-
m(wL) ≤ 0.  
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Proposition 5 Maximizing collections with discrimination results in more collections, 
but not necessarily less deadweight cost than maximizing collections without 
discrimination. 
Proof    Maximizing collections with discrimination results in more collections by 
definition.  If x0  ≤  wL, then maximizing collections without discrimination has zero 
deadweight cost (zero foreclosures and no effort distortion) for all values of b.  
Maximizing collections with discrimination has strictly positive deadweight costs as long 
as that discrimination distorts effort for some of the borrowers. Table 1.  Efficiency and Revenue Effects of Three Collection Policies
Small Amounts of Negative Equity
b ∈ (0,m(w L)] b ∈ (m(w L),x 0]
Foreclosure Rate all policies = 0 0 ≤ c-max < non-disc < FDIC
Effort Distortions 0 = non-disc = c-max < FDIC 0 = non-disc < c-max < FDIC
Total Deadweight Costs 0 = non-disc = c-max < FDIC 0 < non-disc, c-max < FDIC
Revenue Collected all policies = b non-disc < FDIC < c-max ≤ b
Notes: "c-max" = Collection-maximization with means-tests
"non-disc" = Collection-maximization without means-tests
"FDIC" = FDIC-HASP modification rules
b = amount of negative equity
m(w L) = minimum foreclosure cost among borrowers
x 0 = colleciton-maximizing common payment
The Table ranks three different debt collection policies by the foreclosure rate, efficiency 




Fig 1.  Three Mortgage Payment Scenarios
The Figure displays borrower budget sets for three mortgage payment scenarios: pay in full, foreclosure,
and pay only up to the home value. The relative magnitudes of these payments are assumed for the purpose of illustration.

















Fig 2.  Budget Set Induced by FDIC-HASP Means-Tests
The horizontal axis measures borrower income during the benchmark period, from highest to lowest.  a denotes the present value of 
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Fig 3.  Borrowers’ “Demand” for Repayment, Compared with a Means‐Tested Collection Policy
The monotone curve graphs the foreclosure cost inverse CDF, from highest cost to lowest..  The other (red) curve shows the 
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Fig 4.  The Profile of Collection‐Maximizing Marginal Tax Rates
The collection-maximizing marginal tax rate is graphed as a function of borrower productivity.








Fig 5.  Budget Set Induced by Collection-maximizing Means-Tests
The budget curve is convex for the range of incomes in which the mortgage is modified.
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"c-max" = Collection-maximization with means-tests, "non-disc" = Collection-maximization without means-tests, "FDIC" = FDIC-
HASP modification rules.  Two versions of FDIC are shown, depending on whether its foreclosure rate peaks (with respect to b) lower 
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